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In fact, there are also strong domestic incentives for China to halt emissions growth. The Chinese government has learned that it is in its interests to pur-
sue a “green economy” and reduce air pol-
lution as well as to adapt different sectors of 
the society to mitigate some of the harmful 
effects of climate change.
China’s stand
The country is a party to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (1992), its Kyoto Protocol (1997), 
and the Paris Agreement (2015). In contrast 
to the US, where President Trump calls cli-
mate change a “Chinese hoax” and politi-
cians continue to debate whether or not cli-
mate change is caused by human activities, 
there is no dispute about the reality of cli-
mate change in China. The Chinese govern-
ment acknowledges that climate change is a 
serious risk to global security and wellbeing, 
and that China is “one of the most vulner-
able countries” to its adverse effects such 
as extreme weather events, sea level rise, 
floods, etc. Therefore, China has taken part 
in international climate negotiations since 
they started in the late 1980s.
China and international climate politics
Lead the way
by Dr Sanna Kopra, author of China and great power 
responsibility for climate change
After last summer’s devastating for-
est fires and sweltering heat waves 
across the Northern Hemisphere, 
the global consciousness of climate 
change has increased dramatical-
ly. As President Donald J. Trump 
withdrew the United States from 
the Paris Agreement, the first-ever 
universal global climate deal adopt-
ed in 2015, the world has started 
to expect China, alongside the EU, 
to step up its emerging leadership 
role on climate change. In my newly 
published book China and great 
power responsibility for climate 
change I come to a conclusion that 
China indeed seems to be ready to 
live up to that leadership role: it in-
creasingly defines climate responsi-
bility as an attribute of great power 
responsibility and has made all its 
key climate policies public with a 
reference to its great power status.
For years, however, China stressed exclu-
sively the historic, cumulative responsibility 
of developed countries to cut emissions and 
as such refused to commit to any emissions 
reduction targets as they would have harmed 
its overall development plans. Then again, 
after the 2009 Copenhagen climate confer-
ence, where China was harshly criticized by 
many Western politicians and journalists 
for blocking the progress, the country has 
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As American leadership 
over climate change 
declines, China has begun 
to identify itself as a great 
power by formulating 
ambitious climate poli-
cies. Based on the prem-
ise that great powers 
have unique responsibil-
ities, this book explores 
how China’s rise to great 
power status transforms 
notions of great power responsibility in general and interna-
tional climate politics in particular. The author looks empiri-
cally at the Chinese party-state’s conceptions of state respon-
sibility, discusses the influence of those notions on China’s 
role in international climate politics, and considers both how 
China will act out its climate responsibility in the future and 
the broader implications of these actions. Alongside the argu-
ment that the international norm of climate responsibility is 
an emerging attribute of great power responsibility, Kopra 
develops a normative framework of great power responsi-
bility to shed new light on the transformations China’s rise 
will yield and the kind of great power China will prove to be.
played a substantially more constructive role 
in international climate politics. It began to 
collaborate with the US on climate issues, 
and the two countries issued several joint 
climate statements between 2013 and 2016. 
Their climate cooperation increased political 
will around the world and made the conclu-
sion of the Paris Agreement possible in 2015.
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, which 
obligated only developed countries to cut 
their emissions – the key reason that then 
US President George W. Bush found it 
unfair and refused to ratify it in 1998 – 
the Paris Agreement does not set top-down 
emissions reduction targets for any coun-
try. Instead, it is based on states’ nationally 
determined climate strategies to reduce 
emissions. The voluntary nature of the 
agreement appealed to China: it was able 
to set a moderate national contribution that 
it would rather easily exceed and hence gain 
face on the global level.
China’s nationally determined contri-
bution to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change pledges by 
2030 include, first, to achieve the peaking 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions around 
2030 and make a best effort to peak ear-
lier; second, to lower CO2 emissions per 
unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 
level; third, to increase the share of non-
fossil fuels in primary energy consumption 
to around 20%; and lastly, to increase the 
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forest stock volume by around 4.5b m3 over 
the 2005 level.
Nevertheless, according to Climate 
Action Tracker, an independent scientific 
analysis organization, China’s nationally 
determined emissions reduction commit-
ment is “highly insufficient.” If other states 
won’t implement considerably more ambi-
tious emissions reduction measures than 
China, there is little prospect of reaching the 
Paris Agreement’s goal to limit the global 
average temperature rise to 2°C.
The (domestic) climate policy
Since 2006, China has been the big-
gest CO2 emitter, accounting for approxi-
mately 30% of the world’s total emissions. 
In 2007, China issued its first national cli-
mate change programme, and in the fol-
lowing year, China’s first white paper on 
climate change was published. In 2013, the 
state’s first national climate change adap-
tation plan was issued, warning about the 
ill-preparedness of the entire Chinese soci-
ety to the adverse effects of climate change. 
Today, the pursuit of a low-carbon society is 
largely integrated into all development plans 
in China, the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) 
being the key document.
About 60% of China’s energy mix contin-
ues to be based on coal, which causes severe 
air pollution around the country. Given the 
growing discontent over environmental pol-
lution amongst the country’s huge middle 
class (which rose from 80m in 2002 to 430m 
today, only to increase up to around 800m 
in the 2020s), the government has no choice 
but to take the problem seriously. In 2014, 
the Chinese premier indeed declared a “war 
against pollution.” Another important moti-
vator for decreasing the dependence on coal 
and other (imported) fossil fuels is energy 
security. In order to secure the continuance 
of its economic growth, China needs a lot 
of energy as well as considerable natural 
resources (which is one of the main driving 
forces behind the Belt and Road Initiative’s 
projects that are targeted towards African 
and Middle East economies; read more in 
the BTJ 6/16’s article All roads lead to Beijing. 
Setting the world’s agenda with the New Silk 
Road). The 13th Five-Year Plan urges the 
nation to decrease the consumption of coal 
to below 55% and to increase the share of 
the non-fossil energy to 15% of the total 
energy mix. In these efforts, hydropower 
and nuclear energy play the most important 
role, while China has also invested signifi-
cantly in renewable energy. In December 
2017, the country launched the first phase 
of a national emissions trading system, and 
the state has become the biggest investor in 
carbon dioxide capture and storage technol-
ogy in the world.
The Arctic
Recently, China also became increas-
ingly interested in taking part in the eco-
nomics and politics of the Arctic region. In 
January 2018, the Chinese government pub-
lished its long-awaited Arctic white paper 
which describes the state’s visions and poli-
cies in the Arctic and attempts to decrease 
so-called China threat theories that specu-
late about the “real” motives of its regional 
engagement.
In addition to China’s interests in the 
Arctic’s natural resources and new, shorter 
shipping lanes as well as its efforts to 
strengthen its position in international 
political decision-making, climate change 
is an important driver of China’s Arctic 
engagement. China’s Arctic strategy high-
lights the importance of scientific research 
on Arctic change and its global ramifica-
tions. Scientific findings indicate that the 
melting of the Arctic ice cap will increase 
haze pollution in Eastern China, cause 
flooding in many of China’s coastal megaci-
ties, and alter many global natural processes, 
thus potentially hindering agricultural pro-
duction in China. Yet, the Arctic white paper 
introduces no new climate change mitiga-
tion targets or plans, although the country’s 
carbon emissions are the biggest contributor 
to Arctic climate change as such.
Future prospects
In October 2017, President Xi announced 
that China will take the “driver’s seat” in 
international climate negotiations. At pre-
sent, however, it remains unclear in what 
direction China will be driving. Will it 
demonstrate its leadership role by unveil-
ing ambitious climate mitigation plans that 
would inspire the entire world to speed up 
collective efforts to tackle climate change? 
Or will China use its growing leverage 
to reintroduce the bifurcation of climate 
responsibilities into those of the developed 
and those of the developing countries – a 
split abandoned by the Paris Agreement so 
as to make a universal deal feasible?
Since China is the largest carbon emitter 
in the world, its policies for limiting green-
house gas emissions will have a major global 
impact for decades to come. China’s CO2 
emissions decreased between 2014 and 2016 
as a result of decreasing demand for coal that 
was attributable to slow economic growth, 
among other factors. In 2017, however, 
China’s emissions again rose as coal con-
sumption increased. At present, it remains 
unclear whether and how much China’s 
emissions will increase before they reach 
their peak level.
When it comes to Europe-China rela-
tions, climate change mitigation and adap-
tation provides plenty of opportunities to 
cooperate in the fields of emissions trading 
systems, energy efficiency, clean energy, low-
emission transportation, low-carbon cities, 
etc. At the China-EU Summit held in July 
2018, the two parties reaffirmed their com-
mitment to the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement and agreed to intensify their 
cooperation on climate change and clean 
energy. Hence, the EU plays an important 
role in encouraging China to demonstrate 
its climate leadership in practice. 
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